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INDIFFERENCE AND SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Richard G. Kunkel† 
 
Online infringements of copyright have been rampant for 
decades and shows no signs of abating.  Owners of copyrighted films, 
music and books have attempted to hold infringers liable, but the 
expense of enforcing their rights against individual infringers is 
prohibitive.  A more effective method of preventing infringement is to 
attempt to hold online intermediaries, such as Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), secondarily liable for the primary infringements of 
their subscribers.  Theories of contributory infringement, vicarious 
liability and inducement liability all rely on affirmative acts by 
intermediaries that facilitate infringement by others.  In Roadshow 
Films Pty Limited v iiNet Limited, the Australian High Court 
considered whether an ISP’s indifference to primary infringements by 
its subscribers would make the ISP secondarily liable for 
“authorising” the infringements under Australia’s Copyright Act.  
The High Court unanimously ruled that the ISP was not secondarily 
liable for its indifference – despite knowing of specific acts of 
infringement and having ongoing control over its users’ accounts.  
The decision has important legal and public policy implications for 
secondary liability for Internet intermediaries in Australia and 
worldwide.  The High Court decision and its ramifications are 
discussed in this article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The owners of valuable copyrights in digitized music, films, 
books and software have been battling the scourge of copyright 
infringement around the globe for over two decades.1 A variety of 
legislative, judicial and policy initiatives have barely made an impact 
on the extent of copyright infringement occurring globally.2 Internet 
intermediaries, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), peer-to-peer 
networks, user-generated content platforms and technology providers 
																																								 																				
 1. See e.g., REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE LITIGATION 
(2011) [hereinafter GIBLIN, CODE WARS]; Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY 
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL 1, 4-18 (Joe Karaganis, ed., 
2011), http://bit.do/MediaPiracy. 
 2. See e.g., Ted Johnson, Producers’ Coalition Says Copyright Alert System Has Failed 
to Stop Piracy, in VARIETY (May 12, 2015); Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating Graduated Response, 
37 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 147 (2014) [hereinafter Giblin, Graduated Response]; France 
Ends Three-Strikes Internet Piracy Ban Policy, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (July 
10, 2014), http://bit.do/FranceEndsBanPolicy; David Price, Sizing the Piracy Universe, 
NETNAMES (Sept. 2013), http://bit.do/NetNamesPiracy. 
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enable copyright infringement on such a large scale that lawsuits 
against individuals for direct infringement is impracticable.3 
Copyright owners’ only practical alternative is to attempt to hold 
intermediaries liable under a theory of secondary liability.4 Secondary 
liability theories include contributory infringement,5 vicarious 
liability6 and inducement liability.7 
ISPs could play an important role in preventing online piracy of 
digital copyright works. ISPs have the technological capability to 
control traffic flowing through their networks. They also have control 
over the terms of service that govern their ongoing relationship with 
their customers. It is economically efficient for ISPs to use these 
technical and contractual control measures to prevent, or at least 
impede, their subscribers’ infringing conduct online.8 In recent years, 
copyright owners have sought to compel ISPs to engage in the battle 
against online copyright infringement by their subscribers.9 ISPs are 
attractive targets for secondary liability lawsuits because they are 
easily identifiable gatekeepers with deep pockets.10 ISPs and other 
intermediaries understandably wish to avoid the cost of, and potential 
liability for, detecting and deterring infringing conduct online. ISPs 
obviously prefer to have no affirmative legal duties to actively 
monitor their users’ conduct to deter copyright infringement by 
subscribers. 
Several countries, including France and the United Kingdom, 
have enacted legislation to impose on ISPs an affirmative duty to act 
against online copyright infringement through “graduated response” 
																																								 																				
 3. Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property 
Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 247, 254 (2008). 
 4. Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service 
Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 25 (2006) (discussing 
MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005). Professor Elkin-Koren has termed this an 
“enforcement failure,” which leads to under-deterrence of copyright infringement.).  
 5. Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
 6. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); see 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 7. MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005). 
 8. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 256–59 (2006); David Lindsay, Liability of ISPs for End-User 
Copyright Infringements: The First Instance Decision in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet (No 
3), 60(2) TELECOMM. J. OF AUSTL. 29.1, 29.17-18 (2010). 
 9. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: ‘Six Strikes’ Measured 
Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1, 10-16 (2012) (a global 
campaign to enlist ISPs to implement a program of warnings and sanctions against their 
infringing subscribers began as early as 2005). 
 10. Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 26. 
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schemes.11 In general, when copyright owners detect copyright 
infringement online and send a notice to an ISP, these regimes require 
ISPs to warn their infringing subscribers to stop their illegal activity. 
If the subscriber continues to infringe, increasing levels of sanctions 
will typically be applied.12 Other nations, such as Germany, have 
refused to enact graduated response legislation.13 In the United States, 
copyright owners marshaled sufficient political pressure and threats 
of litigation to persuade some major ISPs to “voluntarily” implement 
a graduated response program even without national legislation.14 
In the absence of a new graduated response scheme, whether 
imposed by legislation or negotiated agreement, copyright owners 
have striven to establish secondary liability for ISPs through litigation 
under existing copyright laws. However, ISPs have not yet been held 
secondarily liable for their subscribers’ infringing acts if the ISP 
merely remains indifferent to infringement and fails to take action to 
stop it. In the absence of an affirmative legal duty, intermediaries 
could remain indifferent to infringement.  
Indifference to rampant online copyright infringement was 
arguably justifiable when ISPs often had only general knowledge that 
their networks and services were used for a variety of illegal purposes 
along with legal and legitimate uses. Further, indifference may be 
defensible if an ISP lacks sufficient control over its subscribers’ use 
of its network. For example, in cases involving devices that facilitated 
reproductions of infringing copyright material, the device 
manufacturers had no control over the purchasers’ use of the device 
after the sale, whether for infringing or legitimate uses.15 Secondary 
																																								 																				
 11. Giblin, Graduated Response, supra note 2, at 153-73. These countries include France, 
New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., United Kingdom - 
Digital Economy Act 2010 (UK); New Zealand - (Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) 
Amendment Act 2011 (NZ); France - (Loi 2009-1311 du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection 
pénale de la propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet arts 6 and 7, 251 Journal Officiel de la 
République Française, 29 October 2009). 
 12. See Giblin, Graduated Response, supra note 2, at 153-73 (Some of these graduated 
response schemes initially included suspension or termination of Internet service as a sanction.). 
 13. Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2010) 
(Graduated response schemes were rejected by Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, and Sweden as 
well as in the European Parliament.). 
 14. Bridy, supra note 9, at 11-12; Memorandum of Understanding between content 
owner representatives, the participating ISPs, and the members of the Participating Content 
Owners Group (July 6, 2011), http://bit.do/CopyrightMOU. 
 15. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 
CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 (UK); Australian Tape 
Manufacturers Association Ltd and Others v The Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 177 CLR 
480. 
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liability based on indifference has not been imposed on third parties 
where this element of control is absent. 
Changes in the online environment may be increasing the risk 
that ISPs will be held secondarily liable if they persist in their 
indifference to copyright infringement. Online infringing activity can 
be tracked and documented. In recent years copyright owners have 
undertaken their own monitoring and detection activities that enable 
them to provide ISPs with specific identifying information regarding 
the infringing acts of subscribers on specific ISP networks.16 Today, 
online intermediaries provide services that enable infringement rather 
than devices. These services are delivered pursuant to ongoing 
contractual relationships. ISPs can modify the contract terms from 
time to time to exert control over their users’ online activities. 
Content owners argue that the combination of this knowledge of 
specific acts of infringement and the ISP’s control over their service 
are sufficient to create an affirmative legal duty to take action to 
combat infringement. If this duty were to be legally recognized, ISPs 
would be secondarily liable if they were indifferent to copyright 
infringement and refused to act. Litigation in Australia sought to 
establish secondary liability for an ISP’s indifference to widespread 
copyright infringement by its subscribers. 
Piracy has been a persistent problem in Australia.17 Graduated 
response legislation has not yet been enacted there.18 Instead, 
copyright owners and ISPs have for years attempted to negotiate a 
voluntary industry code of practice similar to graduated response 
schemes implemented in other countries.19 In 2007, lengthy 
negotiations between major copyright owners and ISPs failed to 
produce an agreement for a voluntary graduated response scheme. 20 
																																								 																				
 16. The Copyright Alert System in the United States hired a vendor, Mark Monitor, to 
monitor peer to peer (P2P) traffic to generate infringement notices.  The system sent 1.3 million 
notices in its first year. CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION, THE COPYRIGHT ALERT 
SYSTEM PHASE ONE AND BEYOND 1, 6 (May 28, 2014), http://bit.do/CopyrightAlertSystem. 
 17. Marc C. Scott, From Convicts to Pirates: Australia’s Dubious Legacy of 
Illegal Downloading, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 10, 2015), http://bit.do/ConvictsToPirates. 
 18. AUSTRALIAN ATTORNEY GENERAL JOINT MEDIA RELEASE, COLLABORATION TO 
TACKLE ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://bit.do/CollabToTackle (In 
the past year, the Australian Attorney General and Communications Minister pressured ISPs to 
reach agreement on an industry code of practice by threatening to impose one unilaterally if 
negotiations were unsuccessful. While a draft code was prepared, implementation has been 
delayed due to inability to agree on which parties will bear the costs of the system.); Allie 
Coyne, Australia’s Industry Piracy Code Still Stuck On Cost Debate, ITNEWS (Jul. 22, 2015), 
http://bit.do/AustlPiracyStuck.  
 19. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AH(1) (Austl.). (Development of an industry code 
was provided for in the ISP safe harbour provisions of Australian Copyright Act.).  
 20. See Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2011) 194 FCR 285 (Austl.) [hereinafter, 
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In response, a consortium of movie studios filed suit seeking to 
establish the secondary liability of ISPs for the direct infringement of 
their subscribers. 
The Australian Copyright Act 1968 provides for a statutory tort 
imposing secondary liability on those who “authorise” primary 
infringements by others.21 Case law precedents had broadly 
interpreted authorisation liability under the Copyright Act, making 
Australia a favorable jurisdiction for testing the limits of secondary 
liability for ISPs based on indifference.22 Under these precedents, 
indifference to known online infringement appeared to be sufficient to 
hold an ISP secondarily liable for copyright infringement. In 2009, a 
consortium of movie studios pursued litigation against iiNet, a large 
Australian ISP, as a means to either: 1) increase legal pressure upon 
ISPs to agree to a graduated response program via an industry code, 
or 2) to establish by judicial precedent that ISPs face authorisation 
liability if they are indifferent to copyright infringement on their 
networks. 
Thousands of iiNet subscribers had committed primary 
infringements of the movie studios’ copyrights by downloading 
movies using the BitTorrent peer-to-peer software. The studios 
provided iiNet with detailed information regarding the infringing 
acts.23 The studios’ lawsuit asserted that this knowledge of specific 
infringing downloads, along with iiNet’s technical and contractual 
control over its subscribers, created an affirmative legal duty to 
prevent these infringements. They argued that iiNet authorised these 
infringements not by action, but by indifference, and by failing to take 
action to prevent them. iiNet prevailed in both the Federal trial 
court,24 and on appeal at the Full Federal Court.25 In Roadshow Films 
Pty Limited v iiNet Limited,26 the Australian High Court rejected the 
studios’ claims of secondary liability by indifference in a 5-0 
unanimous decision. The court held that iiNet’s indifference had not 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT], 348-49 (Jagot, J) for background on the industry code and these 
failed negotiations. 
 21. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1) (Austl.). (This article will use the Australian 
spellings “authorise” and “authorisation” as used in the Copyright Act and in Australian case 
law. Citations to Australian cases and statutes also follow Australian citation formats.). 
 22. GIBLIN, CODE WARS, supra note 1, at 119-41. 
 23. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2010) FCA 24 (Austl.) [hereinafter, IINET TRIAL 
JUDGMENT] ¶96-104 (For fifty-nine weeks in 2008 and 2009, extensive spreadsheets detailing 
the infringing downloads were sent to iiNet.).  
 24. Id. at ¶635. 
 25. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20. 
 26. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42 (Austl.) [hereinafter, IINET 
HIGH COURT JUDGMENT]. 
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authorised its subscribers’ illegal downloading activities and that 
iiNet was not secondarily liable.27  
In iiNet, the High Court refused to impose a broad duty upon 
ISPs requiring them to act affirmatively to deter infringements by 
their subscribers. The High Court disapproved of established 
precedents that had used a broad test for authorisation: that one 
“authorises” a primary infringement by another person if they 
“sanction, approve or countenance” the infringement.28 Instead, the 
court revived an older and narrower construction of “authorisation.” 
Under the High Court’s ruling in iiNet, an authoriser’s actions must 
demonstrate an intention to “grant or purport to grant” a third person 
the right to do the infringing act.29 The High Court’s ruling makes it 
very difficult to establish a case of authorisation liability based on an 
ISP’s indifference alone. Affirmative conduct in relation to the 
primary infringements is required. In addition, the High Court 
directed the copyright owners to Parliament to seek legislation 
creating expanded duties for ISPs.30 
This article will consider the High Court decision in iiNet and its 
implications for secondary liability in Australia and worldwide. The 
iiNet decision likely will have an impact internationally as other 
countries consider graduated response schemes that would require 
Internet intermediaries to monitor, detect and sanction infringing acts 
by their subscribers. Part I reviews the factual and legal background 
of the iiNet case. Part II reviews the history and development of 
authorisation law principles in Australia. Part III analyzes the main 
principles and legal reasoning of the High Court judgment in the iiNet 
case. Part IV will discuss the impact of the iiNet decision on 
secondary liability in Australia, and the public policy decisions 
surrounding graduated response proposals. 
I. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ROADSHOW FILMS PTY 
LIMITED V IINET LIMITED 
Thirty-four major motion picture studios located in Australia and 
the United States sued iiNet claiming that iiNet was secondarily liable 
for authorising the copyright infringement committed by its 
																																								 																				
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 62-63; Id. at 85, 89 (discussing the holding in University of New South Wales v 
Moorhouse & Angus & Robertson (Publishers) Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 1 (Austl.)). 
 29. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 61, 84-85 (discussing the holding in 
Falcon v Famous Players Film Co. (1982) 2 KB 474 (Atkin, LJ) (UK)). 
 30. Id. at 71 (French, J), and at 82 (Gummow, J). 
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subscribers.31 The studios had formed an industry association known 
as the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft (AFACT).32 
AFACT acted on behalf of its membership to investigate online 
copyright infringement and to engage in activities to discourage 
infringements. 
At the time, iiNet Limited was the third-largest Internet service 
provider in Australia. Like many technology startups, iiNet 
commenced operations in a garage in 1993. iiNet was listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 1999, when it had fewer than 20,000 
subscribers.33 iiNet enjoyed rapid and sustained growth, and grew to 
become the second largest DSL broadband supplier in Australia. It 
provided a broad range of Internet and technology services, and grew 
to have more than 2500 employees34 and a market value in excess of 
A$1.5 billion.35  
Online piracy of copyrighted material is an especially significant 
problem in Australia for a variety of reasons. 36 These include delayed 
release of content already legally available overseas,37 differential 
pricing charging Australians higher prices for legal digital content 
available for less in other countries,38 and, until recently, lack of 
available legal access to the most current and desirable content.39 
																																								 																				
 31. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶2. 
 32. Id. at ¶80-82 (AFACT was working closely with the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) in pursuing the litigation.); See Myles Peterson, Australia: U.S. Copyright 
Colony, or Just a Good Friend (January 21, 2012) http://bit.do/CopyrightColony (The article 
includes supporting links to Wikileaks.org. http://bit.do/PublicLibraryUSDiplomacy. The 
AFACT group now calls itself the “Australian Screen Association”; 
http://bit.do/AustlScreenAssoc.) 
 33. A timeline of milestone events in iiNet’s history is available at 
http://bit.do/iiNetHistory.  
 34. iiNet Media Release, iiNet Gains Further International Plaudits (May 6, 2014), 
http://bit.do/iiNetMediaRelease. 
 35. David Ramli & Tess Ingram, iiNet Shareholders Vote in Favour of TPG Telecom 
Merger, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 27, 2015), http://bit.do/iiNetShareholderVote (iiNet 
was sold to TPG Telecom for A$1.56 billion in July, 2015).  
 36. Freya Noble & Heather McNab, House of Thieves: How Australians Have Become 
the World’s Worst Internet Pirates... Ripping Off the Final Season of House of Cards Far More 
Than Any Other Country, DAILY MAIL AUSTRALIA (Mar. 2, 2015), 
http://bit.do/AustlWorstPirates; Michael Idato, House of Cards Season 3 Piracy Booms in 
Countries Without Netflix, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (March 2, 2015), 
http://bit.do/HouseofCardsPiracy; Bernard Zuel, Australians World’s Worst for Illegal Music 
Downloads, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 19, 2012), http://bit.do/AustlWorstIllegalMusic.  
 37. Nick Evershed, Australian Film Industry Claims Delayed Release Is Rare but Data 
Shows Otherwise (June 30, 2014), http://bit.do/AustlDelayedRelease. 
 38. HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS, AT 
WHAT COST? IT PRICING AND THE AUSTRALIA TAX (July 2013), 
http://bit.do/HouseOfRepITPricing. 
 39. Marc Moncrief, Stan, Netflix, Presto: Is Streaming the End of Piracy? SYDNEY 
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When the 2009 litigation began, the movie studios were aware of 
studies showing that 57% of all Internet traffic in Australia in 2007 
was peer-to-peer file transfers, and 73% of that traffic involved the 
BitTorrent protocol.40 More than half of the traffic on iiNet’s network 
represented uploads and downloads using peer-to-peer software, 
primarily BitTorrent.41 It is widely understood that a substantial 
portion BitTorrent traffic infringes copyrighted materials. 
The movie studios hired DTecNet, an Internet-surveillance firm, 
to monitor public peer-to-peer networks for infringing activity. 
DTecNet used a thorough process to identify the IP addresses of iiNet 
users who committed primary infringements of the studios’ films by 
sharing or downloading the films using BitTorrent.42 DTecNet 
compiled this identifying information into spreadsheets cataloging 
and summarizing the infringing conduct of iiNet users and forwarded 
it to AFACT. Acting on behalf of the studios, AFACT supplied iiNet 
with messages entitled “Notice of Infringement of Copyright” each 
week for fifty-nine weeks in 2008 and 2009 (the “AFACT Notices”). 
43 The AFACT Notices identified the IP addresses of those iiNet users 
who were shown by DTecNet data to be “repeat infringers,” i.e. those 
who had made multiple infringing downloads. The letters “required” 
that iiNet take unspecified actions to prevent further infringements.44 
The implication was that iiNet should undertake an unspecified type 
of graduated response program. Importantly, the AFACT notices 
contained no information regarding the methods used to obtain the 
identifying information or to confirm that the files contained 
copyrighted films.45 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 4, 2015), http://bit.do/StreamingEndtoPrivacy. 
 40. Internet Study 2007, IPOQUE (2007), http://bit.do/Ipoque2007. 
 41. See IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 379, 383 (Jagot, J) (The full 
Federal Court referred to this fact several times). 
 42. See IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶113. (DTecNet used a customized 
version of BitTorrent client software to identify the digital files of copyrighted films being 
shared online. DTecNet downloaded one copy of each suspected file, viewed the file to confirm 
that it was a film under the studios’ copyright, and identified the IP addresses of the BitTorrent 
users sharing the file containing film. Next, DTecNet used a filter to identify only those users 
who had IP addresses issued by iiNet’s service. Finally, DTecNet created a detailed daily log of 
information about the files exchanged by iiNet users containing the studios’ copyrighted works, 
the relevant IP addresses of iiNet users and other detailed identifying information. This 
investigation produced an extremely detailed inventory of the alleged primary infringements by 
iiNet users.). 
 43. Id. at ¶96-104. 
 44. Id. at ¶98 (The trial judge, Cowdroy J, concluded from other evidence that AFACT 
wanted iiNet to initiate a graduated response scheme to warn, suspend or terminate users, which 
AFACT had been negotiating with the Internet Industry Association.); Id. at ¶440. 
 45. Id. supra note 23, at ¶79-154, ¶468-69. 
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In response, iiNet did nothing to identify the accounts of 
infringing subscribers or to take measures against them. The process 
of identifying individual subscribers from the IP address data was 
complex and expensive, and iiNet was unwilling to incur the costs 
based on unverified allegations of infringement.46 iiNet also 
determined that it could not make the complex legal determination 
necessary to determine whether copyright infringement had actually 
occurred, even though the identifying information was quite detailed. 
iiNet did not learn the details of the DTecNet surveillance methods 
until the court proceedings began. Only then did Michael Malone, 
iiNet’s founder and managing director, concede at trial that the 
DTecNet evidence was “compelling.”47 Even so, he maintained that 
claims of infringement had to be evaluated by an independent third 
party before moving from allegation to punishment.48 iiNet chose to 
take no action until AFACT’s claims of primary infringement were 
tested and proven in court.  
When iiNet failed to implement a form of graduated response 
against its subscribers as AFACT had sought, the movie studios sued. 
The studios claimed that iiNet subscribers had engaged in primary 
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act by making copies of 
the studios’ films, by making the films available online and by 
electronically transmitting the films using the BitTorrent peer-to-peer 
software protocol. 49 Most importantly, the studios also claimed that 
iiNet had authorised the subscribers’ primary infringements by 
indifference based on two factors. They argued that iiNet had a legal 
duty to act because: 1) the AFACT notices established that iiNet 
knew specific infringements were occurring and were likely to 
continue and 2) iiNet took no action against the primary infringers 
(such as suspending or terminating their accounts) even though it had 
the right to do so under the company’s Customer Relationship 
Agreement (“CRA”) and had the technical ability to do so. The 
studios sought monetary damages and injunctive relief.50 
iiNet contended that its action—or rather, its indifference and 
lack of action—did not amount to authorisation of its subscribers’ 
infringements. Although a large portion of its traffic used BitTorrent, 
such traffic could include either infringing or non-infringing content. 
Thus, iiNet claimed that the AFACT notices were “mere allegations” 
																																								 																				
 46. Id. at ¶27. 
 47. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶172-80. 
 48. Id. at ¶179. 
 49. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 and s 86(c) (Austl.); IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra 
note 23, at ¶266-69. 
 50. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶12-16. 
2016] SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  11 
of infringement.51 iiNet lacked sufficient information to verify 
whether the allegations were true or whether the contents truly were 
infringing. iiNet asserted that it was not obligated to incur the 
significant expenses necessary to take action against its subscribers 
under the CRA until the studios’ claims of primary infringement were 
proven in court. iiNet also argued that it had no control over the 
BitTorrent protocol or the manner in which iiNet subscribers chose to 
use it. Thus, it had no power to prevent the infringing acts.52 
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BY 
AUTHORISATION IN AUSTRALIA 
Australian law has recognized secondary liability for 
“authorising” copyright infringement for more than 100 years.53 The 
current language of the Copyright Act 1968, Section 101(1) is: 
Subject to this Act, a copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part is 
infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and 
without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or 
authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.54 
A century of legal interpretation regarding authorisation liability 
has produced a body of law fraught with uncertainty and confusion. 
Professor Giblin has observed: “Eminent commentators have 
variously described it as ‘unclear,’ ‘hard to reconcile,’ ‘enshrouded’ 
in confusion, ‘incoherent,’ and ‘unnecessarily complex and 
uncertain.’”55 The iiNet case is emblematic of this confusion: it 
produced six separate judgments, each varying from the others in the 
analysis and reasoning applied. 56 This creates a very uncertain legal 
environment for ISPs and other Internet intermediaries. 
																																								 																				
 51. Id. at ¶27. 
 52. Id. at ¶17-31. 
 53. Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) s 13, s 14 and s 34 (Austl.). (Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) 
(Austl.) adopted the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) into Australian law.). 
 54. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1) and s 13(2) (Austl.) (emphasis added). 
 55. Rebecca Giblin, The Uncertainties, Baby: Hidden Perils of Australia’s Authorisation 
Law, 20 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 148, 149 (2009) [ hereinafter Giblin, Uncertainties]; (citing 6 
Laddie H et al., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS (3rd ed., Butterworths, 
London, 2000) 1772 at 39.14); Jennifer E. Stuckey, Liability for Authorizing Infringement of 
Copyright, 7 UNSWLJ 77, 78 (1984); David Lindsay, Internet Intermediary Liability: A 
Comparative Analysis In The Context Of The Digital Agenda Reforms, 1 & 2 COPYRIGHT 
REPORTER 70, 77 (2006). 
 56. The six judgments are: the judgment of Cowdroy, J, at the trial court; the separate 
judgments of Emmett, Jagot and Nicholas, JJ, at the Full Federal Court; and the judgments of 
French CJ, Crennan and Keifel, JJ; and Gummow and Hayne, JJ, respectively, at the High 
Court.  
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The complexity and uncertainty arise from a number of factors. 
First, case precedents have not been careful to distinguish between 
liability for “authorising” infringement from a separate form of 
liability for “permitting” public performances of works.57 Second, an 
imprecisely-drafted statutory provision intending to partially codify 
the law was added to the Copyright Act in 2001.58 While intended to 
clarify the law and provided greater certainty to intermediaries, it has 
had the opposite effect.59 Third, copyright infringement arises in a 
host of contexts that necessarily involve case-specific issues of fact 
that often involve matters of degree. This is particularly true when 
authorization must be inferred from a failure to act or indifference to 
the primary infringements. Consequently, case precedents often are 
not easily applied to other cases and contexts.60  
A. A Splintered and Confused History 
In 1912, Australia adopted the U.K’s Copyright Act 1911 (the 
“Imperial Act”), which provided liability both for authorising 
infringing copyright activities,61 as well as liability for permitting an 
entertainment venue to be used for infringing public performances.62 
Courts in both the U.K. and Australia very quickly began to 
commingle these two separate forms of secondary liability. 
An early English case, Performing Right Society v. Ciryl 
Syndicate63 construed the Imperial Act’s provisions for authorising an 
infringement and for permitting a performance, based on the 
defendant’s indifference and failure to act to prevent the 
infringements. Professor Lindsay notes that the Ciryl court conflated 
the reasoning regarding authorisation liability and the reasoning 
regarding permitting a performance.64 In iiNet the High Court 
observed that in Cyril the judgment of Bankes, LJ, treated these two 
																																								 																				
 57. See infra section II.A. 
 58. Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 59. Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 155-61; David Lindsay, ISP Liability for End-
User Copyright Infringements: The High Court Decision in Roadshow Films v. iiNet, 62 
TELECOMM. J. OF AUSTL. 53.1, 53.9-53.10 (2012). 
 60. University of New South Wales v Moorhouse & Angus & Robertson (Publishers) Pty 
Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 1, 12 (Austl.) [hereinafter, Moorhouse] (Gibbs, J, observes: “The question 
whether one person authorizes another to commit an infringement depends upon all the facts of 
the case so that a decision on a particular set of circumstances may be of no assistance in other 
cases.”).  
 61. Copyright Act of 1911 (Imp) s 1(2) (UK). 
 62. Copyright Act of 1911 (Imp) s 2(3) (UK). 
 63. Performing Right Society v Ciryl Syndicate [1924] 1 KB 1 (UK). 
 64. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.6 (2012). 
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separate claims as synonymous.65 The Cyril case is important for 
establishing the principle that indifference may reach a degree from 
which either authorisation or permission may be inferred.66  
 Soon, another English case, Falcon v Famous Players Film 
Co.,67 considered a situation in which some producers had imported a 
film to England, where they contracted with a movie theatre owner 
for the purpose of screening the film to the public. While the case 
involved authorisation (not permission), it was based on the 
affirmative acts of the producers, rather than on inaction or 
indifference. Unfortunately, Falcon produced two formulations for 
determining authorisation liability under the Imperial Act. The 
narrower interpretation by Atkin, LJ, held that “to ‘authorise’ means 
to grant or purport to grant to a third person the right to do the act 
complained of, whether the intention is that the grantee shall do the 
act on his own account, or only on account of the grantor.”68 Since 
the producers obviously acted in a way that purported to grant the 
movie theatre the right to screen the film, Atkin, LJ, held them liable 
for authorising the infringement under this narrower test. Bankes, LJ, 
adopted a broader view of authorisation based on synonyms in the 
Oxford dictionary definition of “authorise”: “to sanction, approve, 
countenance.”69 Under this broader test, Bankes, LJ, also held that the 
producers’ affirmative acts had authorised infringement. 
The Australian High Court embraced the “sanction, approve and 
countenance” standard in Adelaide Corporation v Australasian 
Performing Rights Association.70 The case involved permitting a 
performance and was based on the indifference of the owner of a 
performance hall. The owner of a hall leased it to a third party to be 
used for the purpose of vocal concerts by a singer. The hall owner 
failed to stop the performances despite being notified of the 
likelihood that the concert would involve public performance of songs 
infringing copyright. The hall owner’s indifference was obvious: it 
																																								 																				
 65.  IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 78 (Gummow, J). 
 66. Performing Right Society v Ciryl Syndicate [1924] 1 KB 1 (UK), 10; See also The 
Corporation of the City of Adelaide v The Australasian Performing Right Association Limited 
(1928) 40 CLR 481, 504 [hereinafter, ADELAIDE CORPORATION]. 
 67. Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co., [1926] 2 KB 474 (UK). 
 68. Id. at 499 (Atkin, LJ). 
 69. Id. at 491 (Bankes, LJ) (Even this formulation was later disputed. The original 
expression of this definition is from Evans v E Hulton and Co Ltd [1924] 131 LT 534, 535 (UK) 
(citing the Oxford Dictionary definition “to give formal approval to; sanction, approve, 
countenance”). Some contend the definition is conjunctive (sanction, approve and countenance) 
relying on Bankes LJ, in Falcon.) Others contend the definition is disjunctive (sanction, approve 
or countenance) (relying on ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at 504 (Higgins, J)).  
 70. ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66. 
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knew the offending songs were to be performed, and it ignored all 
warnings of the impending infringement from rights holders. 
As a permission case, the narrower test for determining 
authorisation of Atkin LJ—grant or purport to grant—is not even 
mentioned. Even so, Adelaide Corporation often has been cited in 
subsequent authorisation cases for the holding by Higgins J, that 
liability by indifference could not arise in the absence of a direct 
power to prevent the specific infringing act, i.e. the singing of the 
song.71 The court held that the hall owner did not permit the 
infringing concert because it had no direct control or power over the 
infringing vocal performance itself, but only an indirect power to 
prevent it by terminating the entire lease.72  
In The University of New South Wales v Moorhouse,73 the 
Australian High Court considered an authorisation case imposing 
liability for facilitating infringements by indifference or failure to act. 
The case involved a new reproduction technology—the 
photocopier—that threatened to make copyright infringement of 
books easy and inexpensive. The Australian Copyright Council 
instigated a test case concerning the placement of coin-operated 
photocopy machines in university libraries. A person selected a book 
of short stories from the open shelves of a university library and made 
two copies of a short story using the photocopiers provided by the 
library. The case was designed to test whether the library authorised 
the primary infringement by providing both the copyrighted books 
and the photocopiers in public areas of the library.74  
Unfortunately, Moorhouse again split the law by introducing two 
competing formulations, each of which was based on the broader 
“sanction, approve, countenance” standard used in Falcon and 
Adelaide Corporation. The majority decision of Jacobs, J, and 
McTiernan, ACJ, described authorisation as an express or implied 
“permission or invitation to do the acts comprised in the copyright.”75 
Jacobs, J, reasoned that the circumstances of the case—providing the 
photocopiers along with open access to books in the library’s 
collection—created the inference of an implied invitation to use the 
photocopiers “as they saw fit,” which included infringing copying. 
The university had not provided any copyright notices that limited use 
of the copiers only for non-infringing purposes, so the invitation was 
																																								 																				
 71. Id. at 499. 
 72. Id. See also, IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 48 (French, J). 
 73. Moorhouse,, supra note 60. 
 74. Id. at 1. 
 75. Id. at 21 (Jacobs J, and McTeirnan ACJ, agreeing). 
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unqualified. Further, because the circumstances created the inference, 
the degree of the university’s knowledge about any actual infringing 
acts was irrelevant. Professor Lindsay contends that this judgment 
apparently assimilates the earlier precedents on authorisation and 
permission.76 
The minority opinion by Gibbs J, applied the same “sanction, 
approve, countenance” standard to reach a broader interpretation that 
would impose authorisation liability for inactivity or indifference in 
certain circumstances. First, he found that a person cannot authorise 
an infringement of copyright unless he has some power to prevent 
it.77 Next, he observed that express or formal permission or active 
conduct indicating approval is not essential. “Inactivity or 
indifference, exhibited by acts of commission or omission, may reach 
a degree from which an authorisation or permission may be 
inferred.”78 Gibbs, J, reasoned that if: 1) a person has control over the 
means of infringement, 2) makes it available to others, 3) and knows 
or has reason to suspect the infringing conduct, then a failure to act 
(by taking reasonable steps to limit its use to legitimate purposes) will 
result in authorisation.79 Professors Burrell and Weatherall note that 
the Gibbs judgment may be read to have significantly broadened 
authorisation liability to include cases in which the defendant merely 
permitted the infringements provided some elements of knowledge 
and control were present.80 The Moorhouse decision has been 
criticized for being overly broad and introducing considerable 
uncertainty into authorisation liability.81  
 The Gibbs judgment’s broad interpretation of secondary 
liability is a dangerous precedent for the many Internet intermediaries 
who make available facilities, services or platforms that can be used 
to facilitate copyright infringement. Like iiNet, these intermediaries 
have ongoing relationships with their users. They exert contractual 
control over their users in the terms of service governing the use of 
their service. These terms can be updated as needed to respond to new 
forms of infringing behavior. Under such a broad interpretation, the 
																																								 																				
 76. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.7. 
 77. Moorhouse,, supra note 60, at 12 (citing ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at 
503). 
 78. Moorhouse,, supra note 60, at 12 (citing ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at 
504). 
 79. Moorhouse,, supra note 60, at 13. 
 80. Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Providing Services to Copyright Infringers: 
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 723, 732 (2011). 
 81. See Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 157; Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, 
at 730-32; (The Moorhouse standard was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH 
Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR 339 (Can.)). 
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only remaining factor required for a finding of authorisation liability 
is knowledge. Intermediaries would typically have general knowledge 
of the likelihood of infringing activities by users. In the past, this 
knowledge alone likely was insufficient to create an affirmative duty 
for ISPs to act to prevent particular infringing acts. However, today 
copyright owners are able to supply intermediaries with specific 
knowledge of particular infringing acts by identifiable subscribers, as 
occurred in iiNet. Just one message from an aggrieved rights holder 
identifying specific infringements would create an affirmative duty 
for intermediaries to actively monitor the behavior of subscribers and 
others using the service. Under the broad interpretation of the Gibbs 
judgment, intermediary indifference would trigger liability. 
Moorhouse, and particularly the judgment of Gibbs, J, 
interpreting the “sanction, approve, countenance” test, became the 
leading Australian authorisation case. When digital entertainment 
media became commonplace, copying technologies proliferated and 
the emergence of the Internet enabled widespread infringements. 
Australian courts applied Moorhouse, and particularly the Gibbs 
judgment, in a wide range of authorisation cases.82  
B. An Enigmatic Statutory Intervention 
Another source of confusion in Australian authorisation liability 
is the partial codification of the case law that took effect in 2001. The 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, amended Section 
101(1) by adding the following subsection: 
(1A) In determining, for the purposes of subsection (1), whether or not a 
person has authorised the doing in Australia of any act comprised in a 
copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part without the licence of the owner 
of the copyright, the matters that must be taken into account include the 
following: 
(a)  the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the 
act concerned; 
(b)  the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the 
person who did the act concerned; 
																																								 																				
 82. See, e.g., Australasian Performing Right Association Limited v Jain (1990) 26 FCR 
53; Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd and Others v The Commonwealth of 
Australia (1993) 177 CLR 480; Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Metro on 
George Pty Ltd and Others (2004) 61 IPR 575; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v 
Cooper and Others (2005) 150 FCR 1; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd and Others (2005) 65 IPR 289; Cooper v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd and Others (2006) 156 FCR 380; E-Talk Communications Pty Ltd & Anor v 
Universal Music Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] HCATrans 313 (Austl.). 
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(c)  whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or 
avoid the doing of the act, including whether the person complied with 
any relevant industry codes of practice.83 
Section 101(1A) was intended to “elucidate, not vary” the 
existing law on authorisation.84 It was meant to “provide a degree of 
legislative certainty about liability for authorising infringements.”85 
Unfortunately, it had the opposite effect by introducing further 
uncertainty to the already-muddled law on authorisation liability.86 
 The statute lists three factors to inform a court when 
determining whether an inference may be drawn that a defendant has 
authorised an infringement by a third party. However, the statute fails 
to clarify the legal threshold that must be attained to justify the 
inference of authorisation. Section 101(1A) does not mention any of 
the important legal thresholds for imposing authorisation liability 
from prior case law, such as “grant or purport to grant the right,” or to 
“sanction, approve, and/or countenance.” The statute’s factors are 
clearly correlated to the analysis of the minority judgment of Gibbs, J, 
in Moorhouse. However the statute does not account for the very 
different reasoning of the majority judgment of Jacobs, J, and 
McTiernan, ACJ, in Moorhouse based on permission and invitation. 
This created a dilemma for courts attempting to reconcile the case law 
with Section101(1)(A).87  
Second, the statute’s three factors are neither exclusive, nor 
required.88 The non-exclusivity allows courts the freedom to consider 
unique factual circumstances that could not be anticipated in advance 
when drafting the statute.89 Other matters, such as those considered in 
cases prior to the amendments in 2001 may still be taken into 
account.90 For example, the degree of knowledge of the alleged 
authoriser might be considered. While this is necessary for flexibility 
																																								 																				
 83. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1A) (Austl.); see also, s 36(1A) (regarding other 
types of works) (emphasis added). 
 84. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶415 (citing Universal Music Australia Pty 
Ltd and Others v Sharman License Holdings Ltd and Others (2005) 65 IPR 289, 402).  
 85. Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (Cth) (Austl.), Explanatory 
Memorandum at 54 http://bit.do/CopyrightAmendment. 
 86. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.22 (Professor Lindsay asserts that the partial 
codification “conspicuously failed” to clarify the law.); see also Giblin, Uncertainties, supra 
note 55, at 156. 
 87. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.10. 
 88. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 733-34. 
 89. Id. at 742. 
 90. See Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 156 (citing Cooper v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd and Others (2006) 156 FCR 380). 
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to respond to new types of authorising conduct, it comes at the cost of 
certainty and predictability. 
The lower court judgments in iiNet embody the confusion 
regarding the interplay between the case law and Section 101(1)(A). 
The trial judge, Cowdroy J, performed an exhaustive analysis of 
Moorhouse and subsequent authorisation case precedents to conclude 
that iiNet had not authorised the infringements.91 Only after already 
reaching this conclusion against authorisation did Cowdroy, J, 
consider the statutory factors. The trial judge apparently believed the 
mandatory consideration of the three statutory criteria did little to 
vary the case law. 92 This after-the-fact consideration of Section 
101(1)(A) was rejected in all three judgments of the Full Federal 
Court.93 In contrast, on appeal Emmett, J, gave minimal consideration 
to the case law and cited no case precedents for his conclusion on 
authorisation liability. Emmett, J, focused his analysis almost entirely 
on Section 101(1)(A).94 
 Third, the three factors are not requirements for a finding of 
authorisation, but only matters that must be considered. Thus, 
authorisation liability arguably may attach even in the absence of one 
of the factors.95 In this regard, the statute is significantly at odds with 
the case law regarding the requisite “power to prevent” infringements. 
The statutory language is “(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s 
power to prevent the doing of the act concerned.”96  Commentators 
have suggested that the phrase “if any” indicates the liability could 
attach even in the absence of any power to prevent the infringing 
acts.97 This is contrary to the case law holding that a power to prevent 
(and perhaps even a direct power to prevent) is a prima facie element 
of an authorisation claim based on indifference.98 
Finally, authorisation liability cases necessarily involve issues of 
fact, whether one is applying the case precedents or the statutory 
factors. Each of the mandatory factors involves matters of degree, 
particularly the question of the “reasonable steps” an alleged 
																																								 																				
 91. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶357-415. 
 92. Id. at ¶415-16. 
 93. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 315 (Emmett, J); 374-80 (Jagot, J); 
442 (Nicholas, J).  
 94. Id. at 325-34 (Emmett, J). 
 95. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 734. 
 96. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) S. 101(1A) (Austl.). 
 97. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 734; Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 
158. 
 98. Moorhouse, supra note 60, at 12 (citing ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at 
497-98, 503.) 
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authoriser might take. Thus, proper application of the statute requires 
a balancing and weighing of the respective factors that may vary 
considerably on the particular facts of each case.  
C. Disharmony in the Trial and Appellate Court in iiNet 
Given the splintered nature of authorisation case precedents and 
the unsettled interpretations regarding the partial codification in 
Section 101(1)(A), it is perhaps unsurprising that iiNet the case 
produced four conflicting judgments at the trial court and on appeal. 
Each of these judgments applied its own distinctive analysis and 
reasoning for the decision reached, leaving a wide range of issues for 
the High Court to resolve. 
In the trial court, Cowdroy, J, applied the reasoning of Gibbs, J, 
in Moorhouse. The trial judge concluded that having control over the 
true “means of infringement” was the “fundamental and foundational 
element” for establishing authorisation liability.99 Since iiNet had no 
control over the BitTorrent software or the infringing acts that iiNet 
subscribers committed using BitTorrent, iiNet had not authorised the 
infringements. Cowdroy, J, only considered the factors mandated in 
Section 101(1A) after making a finding that iiNet had not authorised 
the infringement.100  This approach was rejected by all three 
judgments in the Full Federal Court.101 
The Full Federal Court dismissed the movie studios’ appeal in a 
2-1 decision.102 Emmett, J, considered that iiNet’s inaction was 
“capable of constituting at least tacit approval.”103 However, he held 
that implementing a graduated response program was not a reasonable 
step due to deficiencies in the AFACT Notices, the costs involved, 
and the liability risks to iiNet if it wrongfully terminated a 
subscriber.104 The Emmett judgment is most notable for its 
speculative attempt to describe the contours of a graduated response 
program that hypothetically could be considered a “reasonable step” 
under Section 101(1)(A). Emmett, J, ruled that ISP action would only 
be required when the ISP had received unequivocal and cogent 
evidence of the primary infringements, reimbursement of the ISPs 
costs to identify and warn subscribers, and indemnification of the 
																																								 																				
 99.  IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶382. 
 100. Id. at ¶416. 
 101. See supra note 93. 
 102. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20. 
 103. Id. at 326 (Emmett, J). 
 104. Id. at 331-34. 
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ISP’s potential liabilities.105 Nicholas, J, also held that iiNet had not 
authorised the primary infringements principally because it was 
reasonable for iiNet to not take action against its subscribers given 
defects in the AFACT notices, the implementation costs for ISPs and 
the liability risks involved.106 
In contrast, Jagot, J, held that iiNet had authorised the 
infringements by its indifference and inaction. The AFACT notices 
were sufficiently detailed and credible to require iiNet to exercise its 
technical and contractual power to control the ongoing relationship 
with its subscribers.107 In adopting an attitude that it had no obligation 
to act upon the AFACT notices, iiNet went beyond mere indifference 
to tacit approval of the infringements of its subscribers.108 
III. THE HIGH COURT’S DECISION IN IINET 
The iiNet case was the first authorisation liability case to reach 
the High Court since Moorhouse in 1975.109 Moreover, iiNet was the 
first case to be considered by the highest-level court in a national 
legal system in which an ISP faced secondary liability for the primary 
copyright infringements of its subscribers.110 When the Australian 
High Court decided Moorhouse, it could not have imagined the high-
speed personal computers and massive digital storage devices that 
today make it possible to reproduce exact copies of copyrighted 
works easily, instantly, and cheaply. Nor could they have envisioned 
the fast broadband networks and peer-to-peer software that allows 
immediate, global distribution of infringing works. The iiNet case 
gave the High Court the opportunity to review Moorhouse in light of 
the impressive digital advances of the intervening thirty-seven years. 
In addition, the High Court had its first opportunity to interpret the 
provisions of Section 101(1A) since they were added to the Copyright 
Act in 2001. 
All five members of the High Court ruled that iiNet’s 
indifference did not constitute authorisation of the primary 
infringements. The High Court issued two judgments. The majority 
judgment of French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel, JJ (hereinafter, the 
“French judgment”) applied the “grant or purport to grant” standard 
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from Atkin, LJ, in Falcon. 111 The judgment focused on the statutory 
factors in Section 101(1A). It emphasized that iiNet’s power to 
prevent infringing acts was limited and indirect. iiNet’s Customer 
Relationship Agreement (CRA) had expressly restricted use of its 
services to legal uses. Consequently, the French judgment held that 
iiNet subscribers could not possibly infer from iiNet’s indifference 
that iiNet had granted them the right to commit the primary 
infringements.112 Further, the French judgment held that authorization 
could not be inferred from iiNet’s indifference because it would not 
be a reasonable step for iiNet to implement the graduated response 
scheme sought by the studios. iiNet merely made an assessment of the 
costs, liability risks and effectiveness of the scheme in light of the 
deficient information in the AFACT notices and determined that it 
was unreasonable to do so.113 
The full statutory analysis of the French judgment was only 
briefly addressed in the minority judgment of Gummow and Hayne, 
JJ (hereinafter, the “Gummow judgment”). The Gummow judgment 
confirmed the French judgment’s analysis that applied the “grant or 
purport to grant” test, and confirmed the conclusion that iiNet had not 
authorised the infringements. First, however, the Gummow judgment 
explored other theories for secondary liability. The judgment 
reviewed general principles of tort law related to liability for 
omissions and failing to act.114 The Gummow judgment gave two 
reasons for refusing to impose a broad duty of care (which it 
compared to negligence) which would require ISPs to act 
affirmatively to prevent primary infringements by subscribers. First, 
such a duty would be so broad that it would create an uncertain legal 
standard for ISP operations.115 Second, it would provide copyright 
owners with a remedy that was not available to them if they had sued 
the primary infringers directly.116 The Gummow judgment found that 
the only practical course of action available to iiNet to prevent the 
acts of primary infringement was to terminate all further Internet uses 
by the subscriber. The Gummow judgment concluded that it was not 
unreasonable for iiNet to be indifferent to the incomplete allegations 
contained in the AFACT notices.117 
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A.  The “Sanction, Approve, Countenance” Standard 
Discredited 
The High Court’s ruling significantly reduced the uncertainty 
and the risk of authorisation liability for ISPs and other 
intermediaries. The Court turned back the clock to 1926 by applying 
the narrower definition of authorisation stated by Atkin, LJ, in Falcon 
v Famous Players: “authorise” means to “grant or purport to grant to 
a third person the right to do the act complained of.”118 This holding 
harmonizes Australian secondary liability law with the law in the 
United Kingdom and that in Canada, each of which had criticized the 
expansive reasoning in Moorhouse.119  
Both judgments in the High Court rejected the use of the 
“sanction, approve, countenance” standard. In response to the 
contention that iiNet’s inaction amounted to “countenancing” of the 
infringements—and thus, authorisation—the French judgment stated: 
“Countenance” is a long-established English word which, unsurprisingly, 
has numerous forms and a number of meanings which encompass 
expressing support, including moral support or encouragement. In both the 
United Kingdom and Canada, it has been observed that some of the 
meanings of “countenance” are not co-extensive with “authorise.” Such 
meanings are remote from the reality of authorisation which the statute 
contemplates. The argument highlights the danger in placing reliance on 
one of the synonyms for “authorise” to be found in a dictionary.120 
The Gummow judgment also criticized the “sanction, approve, 
countenance” approach. The judgment declared that it would be 
wrong to take the one element of the test—countenance—then seek 
the broadest definition of that element to expand the “core notion of 
‘authorise.’”121 Rejecting the studios’ claim that iiNet’s indifference 
amounted to authorisation, the Gummow judgment declared: “The 
progression . . . from the evidence, to “indifference,” to 
“countenancing,” and so to “authorisation” is too long a march.” 122 
The abandonment of Moorhouse’s application of the “sanction, 
approve, countenance” standard appears to have surprised some legal 
commentators who anticipated a close fact-based decision interpreting 
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Moorhouse in light of the statutory amendments in Section 
101(1A).123 The High Court’s “grant or purport to grant” standard 
makes it exceedingly difficult to infer authorisation merely from the 
indifference of an Internet intermediary in a continuing relationship 
with its users or subscribers. Except in unusual cases, the 
intermediary will need to engage some affirmative conduct, such as 
active promotion or encouragement from which the primary infringer 
could infer a grant of a right to infringe.124 The Gummow judgment 
also noted the stark contrast between the “indifference” referenced in 
Moorhouse and the intentional “inducement and encouragement” 
required by the U.S. Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster.125 
B. The Primacy of Section 101(1)(A) Factors 
Under both High Court judgments the first obligation is to 
examine the statutory factors in Section 101(1A) to determine 
whether they support an inference of authorisation when applying the 
“grant or purport to grant” threshold. In rejecting the use of dictionary 
definitions for “authorisation,” the French judgment stated: 
Whilst resort to such meanings may have been necessary in the past, 
attention is now directed in the first place to s 101(1A). That provision is 
intended to inform the drawing of an inference of authorisation by 
reference to the facts and circumstances there identified, and recourse 
must be had to it. That is an express requirement.126 
1. Technical and Contractual Power to Prevent 
Infringements 
With regard to the first statutory factor—the power to prevent 
acts of infringement—both High Court judgments found iiNet’s 
powers to be limited and indirect. The French judgment emphasized 
the utter lack of technical control that iiNet had over any aspect of the 
BitTorrent system, protocol, or the BitTorrent client. Nor did iiNet 
have any control over the uses its subscribers would make of 
BitTorrent, and could not remove, filter, or block any infringing 
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content its subscribers chose to access or store. Despite iiNet’s 
provision of technology to access the Internet, it had “no direct 
technical power at its disposal to prevent a customer from using the 
BitTorrent system to download appellants’ films to that customer’s 
computer . . . .”127 In this regard, the French judgment echoed the 
conclusions of Cowdroy, J, in the trial court.128 
With regard to iiNet’s contractual power over its subscribers, the 
High Court directly applied the narrower definition of authorisation: 
“to grant or purport to grant a right.” By giving its customers access 
to the Internet, it had provided them with the power to use the 
Internet. However this power could be used for both infringing and 
non-infringing purposes. Under the terms of its CRA iiNet prohibited 
use of its service to “commit an offence or to infringe another 
person’s rights; . . . for illegal purpose or practices; . . . or allow 
anybody else to do so.” The High Court found that the CRA gave 
express, formal and positive disapproval of using the Internet for 
infringing purposes, negating any possibility that iiNet had granted its 
subscribers any right to infringe.129 This language echoed the U.K. 
decision in CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad,130 which held that by selling 
tape recording devices to consumers, the seller “conferred on the 
purchaser the power to copy but did not grant or purport to grant a 
right to copy.”131   
The High Court’s assessment of iiNet’s power to prevent the 
infringing acts is starkly different from the judgments in the Full 
Federal Court. Each of the three appellate judgments had found that 
iiNet had both a technical power over its service and contractual 
power under the CRA that it could use to prevent the 
infringements.132 The appellate judgments focused on iiNet’s power 
over its users, by limiting the extent of their access to Internet. iiNet 
could use its technical power to slow, suspend or terminate a user’s 
service. Further, in the CRA iiNet’s users had granted iiNet 
contractual powers to do so if they had used the iiNet service to 
infringe.  
In contrast, the High Court and the trial judge focused on the 
uses that subscribers made of iiNet’s Internet service. Like the trial 
judge, the French judgment found iiNet had no technical power to 
																																								 																				
 127. Id. at 68, 70 (French, J); Id. at 88 (Gummow, J). 
 128. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶407-09. 
 129. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 68.  
 130. CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc (1988) AC 1013 (UK). 
 131. Id. at 1054. 
 132. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 327, 329 (Emmett, J), at 381, 383 
(Jagot, J), and at 449 (Nicholas, J). 
2016] SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  25 
prevent the infringing acts.133 It could only prevent the infringing acts 
by an indirect and limited contractual power to terminate the service 
of the user in its entirety. The Gummow judgment observed that 
Section 101(1A) begins with identification of an act of primary 
infringement, and considers whether a defendant has authorised “that 
act” of primary infringement.134 The Gummow judgment ruled that 
iiNet lacked any power over the uses that subscribers would make of 
iiNet facilities to access the BitTorrent software to make infringing 
copies of the studios’ films. 
2. Direct vs. Indirect Power to Prevent 
The French judgment further constrains authorisation liability by 
construing Section 101(1A)(a) to require that an alleged authoriser 
have a power to prevent primary infringements: 
An alleged authoriser must have a power to prevent the primary 
infringements. Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Jain, 
Tape Manufacturers, Kazaa and Cooper all confirm that there must be 
such a power to prevent. So much had been recognised earlier, in any 
event, in Adelaide Corporation and Moorhouse.135 
Further, the French judgment drew a distinction between direct and 
indirect power to prevent infringement. Citing Adelaide Corporation, 
the French judgment required a direct power to prevent a specific act 
of infringement, and rather than an indirect power that could halt the 
infringements only by terminating an entire relationship.136 With 
regard to BitTorrent use, iiNet was held to have no direct technical 
power over the uses its subscribers made of the iiNet service.137  
Regarding iiNet’s contractual power, the French judgment 
determined that iiNet had only an indirect power because it could 
prevent the primary infringements only by terminating the entire 
relationship.138 In other words, iiNet’s only power was over the 
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users—by terminating all services—and not over the particular 
infringing uses subscribers would choose to make of any services that 
iiNet provided. The Gummow judgment does not discuss this 
distinction between direct and indirect power to prevent. However, 
the judgment noted that iiNet’s powers were limited to controlling the 
contractual relationship. Because iiNet had no control over its 
subscribers’ use of BitTorrent, the “only indisputably practical course 
of action” to prevent the infringements was to exercise a contractual 
power to terminate the service entirely.139 
Commentators have discussed whether the existence of an 
ongoing commercial relationship gives an alleged authoriser a 
continuing degree of control that enables the power to prevent 
infringement.140 In past cases involving the sale of devices that have 
both infringing and non-infringing uses, the relationship ends upon 
completion of the sale. Thus, the manufacturer/seller has no ongoing 
control over either the user or the uses to which the purchaser deploys 
the device, and thus no power to prevent.141 But when the commercial 
transaction involves an ongoing contract to provide a service online—
such as Internet access, or a social media platform—the service 
provider can continually tweak the features of the service and the 
contractual terms of the user relationship in response to infringing 
uses. Thus, iiNet could have modified the terms and conditions of its 
CRA to provide that in cases of confirmed infringement, it would 
implement a graduated response scheme by sending notices, slowing 
service, suspending service, and ultimately terminating service 
altogether. This form of control over the user, together with the 
specific knowledge of particular infringing acts by identified users, 
arguably might be considered a sufficient power to prevent 
infringements. 
 The High Court rejected this argument in iiNet. Two issues 
are critical in assessing the proper use of these indirect powers in a 
continuing relationship. The first is the ability to control uses of the 
service that can prevent infringing acts that fall short of terminating 
the service relationship in its entirety.142 Both High Court judgments 
found that iiNet was unable to do so, given its limited and indirect 
powers. The second issue is whether the indirect power to control 
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users, by limiting or terminating service pursuant to contractual terms 
of service, can be exercised without affecting non-infringing uses.143 
The Gummow judgment expressed the concern that if iiNet exercised 
its indirect power to prevent infringements by terminating accounts, 
the subscribers would lose all beneficial non-infringing uses of the 
Internet.144 The French judgment emphasized that termination would 
be ineffectual because subscribers would merely shift their infringing 
activities to other ISPs and/or to other computers.145 
3. Reasonable Steps to Prevent or Avoid Infringements 
The High Court next analyzed the third statutory factor—
whether iiNet, by failing to act upon the AFACT notices to 
commence a graduated response program—had failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the primary infringements. The 
High Court held that it would not be a reasonable step for iiNet to 
implement a graduated response program.146 Both High Court 
judgments expressed concern about the effectiveness of warnings as a 
means of ending the primary infringements. The absence of any 
required industry protocol binding on all ISPs seriously undermines 
the efficacy of any step iiNet might take—even of the rather drastic 
step of terminating an account entirely. 147 If iiNet were to terminate 
an account, the subscriber could easily create an account with another 
ISP, or access the Internet by other means.148 Thus, termination 
merely relocates the infringing activity from one technology provider 
to another. The Gummow judgment describes termination of user 
accounts as the only indisputably practical solution to prevent the 
infringing act.149 
The High Court also was troubled over the difficulty of 
implementing the graduated response scheme the movie studios 
sought. The French judgment observed that iiNet would need to 
continually update the investigative exercise that the studios had 
undertaken in providing the AFACT notices, yet they had not been 
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provided with the details of the DTecNet technology or methods.150 
The AFACT notices “did not approximate the evidence which would 
be expected to be filed in civil proceedings alleging copyright 
infringement.”151 The High Court acknowledged the liability risk to 
iiNet should the AFACT allegations be proven false. Thus the Court 
held that it was not unreasonable for iiNet to refuse to take action 
based upon the limited information the movie studios had provided. 
The French judgment concluded: 
However, the evidence showed that the inactivity was not the indifference 
of a company unconcerned with infringements of the appellants’ rights. 
Rather, the true inference to be drawn is that iiNet was unwilling to act 
because of its assessment of the risks of taking steps based only on the 
information in the AFACT notices. Moreover, iiNet’s customers could not 
possibly infer from iiNet’s inactivity (if they knew about it) . . . that iiNet 
was in a position to grant those customers rights to make the appellants’ 
films available online.152 
One curious aspect of the judgments is that, after stating that the 
three statutory factors in Section 101(1A) were mandatory and must 
be considered, both judgments failed to specifically discuss the nature 
of any relationship existing between iiNet and the primary infringers. 
Perhaps the High Court found that the analysis of the issue in the trial 
court was dispositive. At trial Cowdroy, J, had recognized the 
continuing commercial relationship between iiNet and its users, but 
found on the evidence that no sufficient nexus existed between the 
infringing acts and iiNet’s profitability or commercial interests.153 
C. Deference to Parliament For Graduated Response 
Legislation 
Finally, the High Court declared its preference that future issues 
regarding graduated response schemes were best resolved by 
Parliament through legislation. The French judgment commented:  
. . . the concept and the principles of the statutory tort of authorisation of 
copyright infringement are not readily suited to enforcing the rights of 
copyright owners in respect of widespread infringements occasioned by 
peer-to-peer file sharing, as occurs with the BitTorrent system. The 
difficulties of enforcement which such infringements pose for copyright 
owners have been addressed elsewhere, in constitutional settings different 
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from our own, by specially targeted legislative schemes, some of which 
incorporate co-operative industry protocols, some of which require 
judicial involvement in the termination of internet accounts, and some of 
which provide for the sharing of enforcement costs between ISPs and 
copyright owners.154 
The Gummow judgment concurred: 
The history of the Act since 1968 shows that the Parliament is more 
responsive to pressures for change to accommodate new circumstances 
than in the past. Those pressures are best resolved by legislative processes 
rather than by any extreme exercise in statutory interpretation by judicial 
decisions.155 
Whether to implement a graduated response scheme is a complex 
national policy decision about which prominent countries have 
reached opposing conclusions.156 Graduated response policies 
implicate issues of freedom of expression, privacy, due process, 
proportionality and transparency.157 It concerns many public and 
private stakeholders whose interests were not represented by the 
litigants in the iiNet litigation. The judicial proceedings included no 
evidence that would influence the proper design and scope of a 
graduated response system, such as reimbursement of costs for ISPs, 
the number of notices or warnings to be sent, the scale of the 
sanctions to be applied, any appeal rights for sanctioned subscribers, 
and the degree and nature of any judicial oversight of a sanctions 
regime. It would have been wholly inappropriate for the High Court 
to attempt to design or implement a graduated response scheme.158 
Whereas legislation can be carefully limited and tailored to 
balance a myriad of competing interests, a High Court decision 
holding ISPs liable for indifference to specific acts of infringements 
on their networks is an extremely blunt instrument. Retaining or 
extending application of the highly uncertain “sanction, approve, 
countenance” standard from Moorhouse would have significantly 
increased the secondary liability risk for ISPs. If the High Court had 
held that an affirmative duty arose whenever specific knowledge of 
infringing acts was provided, intermediaries would need to 
continually monitor the activities of those who use their services. This 
																																								 																				
 154. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 71.  
 155. Id. at 82.  
 156. See discussion supra notes 11-13. 
 157. Bridy, supra note 9, at 37-65. 
 158. But see, IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 333, 343 (Emmett, J) 
(proposing the contours of a judicially-mandated graduated response regime). 
30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.   [Vol. 33 
would be a stifling burden on intermediaries, and would impose 
substantial and unjustified costs on all legal users of the Internet.159 
Such a holding also would have dramatically increased the degree of 
leverage that copyright owners could assert against ISPs and other 
intermediaries in negotiations for a graduated response regime. 
Parliament had previously stated a clear preference in the 
Copyright Act that copyright owners and intermediaries negotiate the 
contours of any affirmative duties for ISPs to educate, warn, suspend 
or terminate infringing users in an agreed industry code.160 An 
exapnded threat of litigation likely would have distorted the policy 
choices to be made when Australian ISPs and major copyright owners 
negotiated the contours of a private “voluntary” graduated response 
scheme through an industry code. In the absence of such pressures, 
ISPs are able to assert the interests of their customers and the public 
interest regarding freedom of expression, privacy, due process and 
other important values in the negotiations. If the movie studios had 
prevailed in iiNet, ISPs would have been under severe pressure to 
expediently avoid litigation at the lowest cost. Copyright owners’ 
private interests would have dominated the negotiations without 
regard to the important public policy issues at stake. 
Fortunately, in iiNet the High Court unanimously rejected an 
expansive interpretation of Australia’s authorisation statutes that 
would have created an affirmative duty for ISPs. Under the High 
Court’s “grant or purport to grant” standard in iiNet, ISPs can clearly 
negate any inference that they are granting a right to infringe 
copyright in the contractual Terms of Service governing their 
relationship with their subscribers. ISPs presumably will be savvy 
enough to avoid any affirmative acts to induce, encourage or actively 
incite infringements. Now that iiNet has removed most of the 
uncertainty regarding potential authorisation liability grounded upon 
indifference, ISPs are free to negotiate for an industry code that will 
properly account for important issues such as payment of ISPs’ 
expenses, the number of notices, degree of sanctions, appeal rights for 
accused subscribers, and judicial oversight. Copyright owners will 
resist such efforts. Thus it seems likely that Parliament itself will have 
to consider the design any graduated response scheme and whether to 
enact it into law. 161 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF IINET IN AUSTRALIA AND INTERNATIONALLY 
The Australian High Court’s unanimous ruling in iiNet clearly 
rejects the argument that an ISP may be liable for mere indifference 
to copyright infringement online. In iiNet the High Court maintained 
the status quo by refusing to be the first court at the highest level of a 
national legal system to impose secondary liability on ISPs for mere 
indifference to specific acts of primary infringement known to be 
occurring on their networks. In this respect, the iiNet decision is 
perhaps most important for what it did not do. 
Even so, the iiNet decision is quite important for what it did do 
for Australian law. The High Court provided a much more certain 
legal landscape for Australian ISPs and other intermediaries whose 
users may inevitably infringe copyright. By disapproving of the 
overly broad “sanction, approve, countenance” standard applied in 
Moorhouse the High Court removed a tremendous amount of 
uncertainty from Australian law governing authorisation liability. The 
High Court clarified the importance of Section 101(1)(A) as the 
principal determinant of authorisation liability. Moreover, the High 
Court established the legal threshold that the statutory factors must 
meet to justify an inference of authorisation—“to grant or purport to 
grant” a right to infringe. ISPs will expressly negate any inference 
that they are granting a right to infringe in their contractual terms of 
service. If ISPs also are careful to avoid affirmative acts that 
encourage, promote or condone the primary infringements they will 
avoid secondary liability. Finally, both High Court judgments require 
a power to prevent the acts of primary infringement, and further, that 
the power must be a direct power. Each of these facets of the iiNet 
decision reduces the uncertainty and secondary liability risk facing 
Australian ISPs. 
The iiNet decision does not, however, resolve all of the 
outstanding questions regarding authorisation law in Australia. The 
decision relies heavily on the statutory factors in Section 101(1)(A), 
which were based on Moorhouse and which reflect the broad 
interpretation for “authorisation” of Gibbs J. The High Court did not 
repudiate Moorhouse, even though both judgments rejected the 
reasoning in the case. Instead the High Court distinguished 
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Moorhouse on the facts, perhaps to minimize the appearance of the 
plain conflict between its reasoning and case law origins of the 
statute.162 In adopting the narrow interpretation of “authorisation” in 
its “grant or purport to grant” threshold, the High Court introduces 
further confusion over the applicability of Moorhouse and subsequent 
cases applying its reasoning.163 Lower courts will need to reconcile 
these conflicts. Inconsistencies are likely to arise, meaning that the 
High Court may well consider these issues again in the foreseeable 
future. It is clear, however, that mere indifference to the acts of 
primary infringement will not lead to authorisation liability. 
The iiNet decision will also have a strong impact internationally. 
Two trends in the online world have created the potential for a further 
broadening of secondary liability for ISPs. First, the number and 
variety of services delivered online by intermediaries is expanding 
rapidly. These services feature ongoing contractual relationships that 
allow the intermediary continuing control over Internet users through 
their terms of service. Second, an expanding range of Internet 
surveillance tools allow copyright owners to provide more detailed 
information about specific acts of copyright infringement online. 
Taken together, the increased control and specific knowledge might 
be interpreted broadly to establish an affirmative duty for ISPs to act 
to prevent primary infringements on their networks. Australia, with its 
embrace of the broad definition of “authorisation” from Moorhouse, 
was the ideal forum for such an expansion. The iiNet case thwarted 
the potential for this expanded form of secondary liability for ISPs. 
The case confirmed the legal boundary for the furthest reach of 
secondary liability based on indifference by adopting the “grant or 
purport to grant” standard. 
With regard to public policy, the High Court’s deference to 
Parliament will signal that copyright owners will need to develop 
other strategies for engaging ISPs and other intermediaries in the 
battle against rampant copyright infringement online. Using the threat 
of litigation-based judicial recognition of expanded theories of 
secondary liability as a lever to procure negotiated graduated response 
schemes appears to have reached its outer limit. Instead, copyright 
owners will need to seek legislation establishing new graduated 
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response schemes. This will enable broad participation by Internet 
users, interest groups and intermediaries in the public debate. This 
transparency will ensure that any such regimes are properly limited 
and respect essential freedoms and rights as discussed above. 
In addition, public scrutiny of any graduated response proposals 
during Parliamentary proceedings will allow a searching investigation 
of the efficacy of such schemes. A full review of the merits and 
deficiencies of graduated response is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, Rebecca Giblin’s comprehensive review in 2014 of 
graduate responses programs in a number of countries concluded that 
graduated response schemes are not effective in achieving their 
objectives.164 Consequently, the iiNet case played a large role in 
delaying the adoption of an industry code implementing a graduated 
response scheme—and perhaps preventing an expensive and 
ineffective program from ever being enacted in Australia. 
CONCLUSION 
In iiNet, Australia’s High Court confirmed that an ISP may 
remain indifferent to copyright infringement occurring on its network. 
The decision helpfully clarified the law of authorisation liability in 
Australia and narrowed Australian law to be consistent with 
international norms. By reducing uncertainty and limiting an ISP’s 
risk of secondary liability, the judgment also blunted the litigation 
pressure that copyright owners were able to exert against ISPs to 
agree to a privately negotiated industry code for a graduate response 
scheme. The High Court properly allowed the issue of an ISP’s 
affirmative duties to assist in the battle against online copyright 
infringement to be decided by Parliament with input from all relevant 
stakeholders and the public. 
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